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Introduction 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) was signed into law on 
August 13, 1982. Incorporated into this legislation were substantial 
changes in depreciation and tax calculation procedures. Although this 
act does not contain provisions specific to agriculture, it will likely 
affect the investment and economic activity of this sector. For 
instance, Durst, Rome, and Hrubovcak {3} have identified twenty-six 
provisions of the new law which are significant to the agricultural 
sector. The degree to which these affect agriculture has not yet been 
fully determined. 
The effects of income tax policy on the structure of the farming 
industry have long been argued. Raup [6} has suggested that such income 
tax policies as investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation, use of 
cash basis accounting, and the deductibility of interest as a business 
expense stimulate the demand for capital items. Gardner [4, p. 839} has 
noted that the tax code contains provisions which "enable an operator to 
increase wealth by investment without incurring the tax liabilities that 
at first glance the tables might suggest... Boehlje and and Carmen [1, 
p. 1036] suggest that the 1981 law may increase thiR potential because 
it allows for substantial increases in the present value of depreciation 
deductions over that allowed in pre-1981 law. Further, they argue that 
1981 depreciation methods can have "a differential impact on after-tax 
returns for farm enterprises" and because enterprise mix will vary by 
region of the nation, the new tax law will have "significant regional 
impacts on effective tax rates" for farmers. 
Casler [2] does not necessarily agree with these suggested impacts. 
He constructed several examples where the present value of depreciation 
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was greater under pre-1981 law than for post 1981-law. Casler concludes 
that the advantage of The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (the 1981 
depreciation method) is largely for assets acquired late in the year by 
relatively large farmers. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the likely impacts on 
farmers' tax liabilities resulting from changed depreciation rules and 
tax rate schedules as provided by ERTA. Simulation of depreciation 
deductions and tax liabilities using farm records data will be reported. 
Features of both pre- and post-ERTA law are simulated. The differ-
ential impact of the changed tax law across farm size is a primary 
focus. 
The 1981, 1982 Tax Acts 
In an apparent effort to stimulate investment in capital assets, 
authors of the ERTA incorporated major changes in depreciation methods, 
investment tax credits and the tax rate structure. The Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (ACRS) replaced existing depreciation methods. Under 
this system, all assets are categorized into four life classes. 
Automobiles, light-duty trucks and breeding swine are examples of three 
year property. Most equipment, breeding cattle and sheep, tile, storage 
facilities, and single purpose agricultural buildings are five year 
property. Other buildings and most land improvements are fifteen year 
property. The depreciation deduction under ACRS is determined by 
multiplying the unadjusted basis in the property by a specified percen-
tage. Salvage values are ignored for recovery property in all depre-
ciation calculations after 1981. 
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The additional first year depreciation (AFYD) of pre-ERTA tax Law 
was replaced with an expensing provision. One difference of the 
expensing provision from AFYD is that it is limited not to 20 percent of 
the qualifying investment (up to $20,000 if married filing jointly), but 
rather to $5,000 per year. The amount expensed reduces the basis for 
calculation of both depreciation and investment tax credit. 
The ERTA also liberalized the rules concerning investment tax 
credits (IC). Under pre-ERTA law, only machinery, equipment, or single 
purpose agricultural structures with depreciable lives of seven or .ore 
years were eligible for the full 10 percent IC; assets with depreciable 
lives of 5 or 6 years were eligible for a 6 percent IC and those with 
depreciable lives of 3 or 4 years could receive 3 percent IC. If an 
asset was sold prior to a 3-year (5 year) holding period the entire (one 
third) !C was subject to recapture. ERTA allows a 10 percent IC for all 
5 year property and a 6 percent IC for 3 year property. The IC recap-
ture rule was modified to allow some IC even if the asset were held only 
for one year. Furthermore, increases in the IC limitation were sche-
duled for each of the years 1981-83. 
The ERTA also contained provisions for reductions in the tax rate 
schedules in each of the years 1981-84. The general effect was an 
across the board rate reduction of 5 percent in 1981, 10 percent in each 
of 1982 and 1983, and a further 5 percent reduction for 1984.!1 The 
result was a reduction in the maximum tax rate from 70 percent in 1980 
to 50 percent in 1983. 
To moderate some aspects of the ERTA, Congress passed the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), with most provi-
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sions effective in 1983 and later years. The TEFRA provided several 
changes in depreciation and investment tax credit calculations. The 
taxpayer was given the option to either (1) to claim the full investment 
tax credit but reduce the basis for depreciation calculation by the 
amount of 50 percent of the IC claimed or (2) reduce the investment tax 
credit percentage by 2 percent and continue to calculate the depre-
ciation on the unadjusted basis. Furthermore, the TEFRA reduced the 
maximum amount of IC which would be claimed and cancelled an increase in 
the rate of depreciation scheduled to take place in 1984. 
The Data Source and1 Tax Simulation 
The source of data for these analyses is a sample of individual 
cash grain producers, drawn from the Illinois Farm Business Farm 
Management Association (FBFP). The membership of the FBFM does not 
constitute a random sample of Illinois farmers; however, the difference 
in these groups may not be great. Mueller [5, p. 292} compared a sample 
of FBFM cooperators to a random sample of Illinois producers and 
concluded that the differences were "essentially differences in the 
quantity of basic resources, particularly land and capital utilized by 
the farm operators ••• and, given equal basic resources, managerial 
ability is not greatly different on record keeping and survey farms". 
There are aspects of the FBFM sample which provide more accurate 
data than that which could be expected from a random sample of produ-
cers. The FBFM records are standardized in accounting format. Further, 
field agents are used·to increase accuracy and standardization. The 
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FBFM records also provide observations for a relatively large number of 
producers for a multi-year period. 
A sample of FBFM cash grain producers is used in these analyses. 
There were records for 167 producers who were continuously enrolled in 
the FBFM program for the five year period, 1975-79. Average farm size 
was 522 tillable acres with a standard deviation of 229 acres. Farm 
sizes ranged from 140 to 1632 tillable acres. 
Because it is the purpose of this study to compare the tax liabili-
ties of different size farm operations and for farmers using various 
methods of tax computation, it is necessary that substantial information 
concerning income, expenses, and depreciable investment inventories be 
included. Although the FBFM records data do not specifically include a 
measure of the federal income tax paid, the information required for 
these calculations is available. A schedule of depreciable assets for 
each farm includes the acquisition date, value of trade-in, and purchase 
price for each asset. 
In the following analyses, depreciation and income taxes were simu-
lated utilizing the 1975-79 investment data and assuming, in turn, the 
provisions of the 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 tax codes. In each case, 
the tax law was assumed to have been in place through the entire 
1975-1979 period. A difficulty with this methodology arises because the 
actual investment decisions of the farm operators during this period 
were not based on the post-ERTA tax codes. Because the ERTA allows 
investments to be depreciated more quickly than the prior provisions, it 
is reasonable to believe that farmer investments would have been larger 
had this law been in effect during the 1975-79 period. Hence, the 
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amount of ACRS depreciation is probably understated and the resulting 
tax liability is therefore overstated in this simulation. Furthermore, 
because of the short time series of data available, carryback and carry-
forward provisions of the law were not recognized in the simulation. 
This also will tend to understate the difference in pre- and post-ERTA 
tax liabilities. 
A Comparison of ACRS and Pre-ERTA Depreciation Methods 
To allow comparison of pre- and post-ERTA depreciation provisions, 
depreciation and taxes were simulated by applying each of these depre-
ciation methods to the 1975-79 accounting data of the FBFM sample. In 
each case the designated tax law was assumed to have been in place 
throughout the entire five year period~/ The producer was assumed to 
make full use of investment tax credits as provided by each law. For 
cases of partial ownership the tax calculation is for the operator share 
only. 
For the pre-ERTA depreciation calculation the declining balance 
depreciation method was used. Asset service lives of 7 years for 
machinery and 20 years for buildings were aseum~d. Seven years corres-
ponds with the minimum service life at which full investment tax credit 
could be claimed for machinery and equipment assets. Twenty years is 
the minimum length of life specified for farm buildings in the Class 
Life ADR guidelines of 1980 law. Zero salvage values were assum~d. 
Declining balance depreciation rates of 100, 150, and 200 percent of the 
straight line rate were used for different asset categories as sp~­
cified in the 1980 tax code. It was also assumed that the producers 
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would make full use of the additional first year depreciation (AFYD) 
provision of the 1980 law. 
Post-ERTA depreciation was simulated using the ACRS method. All 
machinery, equipment and single purpose buildings were classified as 5 
year property. All other buildings were classified as 15 year property. 
The expensing option of ERTA was in turn included and excluded from the 
simulation. 
Table 1 presents the results of the simulation for each of the 
years 1975-79. Depreciation values (including AFYD) resulting from 
application of the pre-ERTA method ranged from an average $11,804 in 
1975 to $15,814 in 1979. Application of the ACRS method (without the 
expensing option) resulted in average depreciation values of $13,019 and 
$20,834 for 1975 and 1979, respectively.~/ Utilization of the 
expensing option of 1981 law reduced the amount of the depreciation 
deduction. This is because the amount of expensed investment is 
excluded from the basis for depreciation. The expensed amount also 
reduces the basis for investment tax credit calculation. The result is 
a smaller IC when the ~xpensing option is taken, and for this sample, a 
larger tax liability after credits. 
The tax liabilities (before credits) presented in Table 1 indicate 
the magnitude of tax savings attributable to the changed depreciation 
method. The tax rate schedules employed in 1980 and 1981 were iden-
tical; the sole difference was a 1.25 percent tax credit available to 
all taxpayers in 1981. However, this credit is not reflected in the tax 
before credits reported jn Table 1. The changed tax liability (before 
credits) due solely to the change in depreciation method ranged from 
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$418 to $1,497 over the five year period (expensing option ignored). 
When the expensing option is utilized, however, the magnitude of tax 
savings is decreased. 
Impacts of the TEFRA 
The 1983 tax law was changed by the TEFRA to either (1) reduce the 
basis of depreciable assets or (2) reduce the amount of investment tax 
credits which could be claimed by the producer. This resulted in 
reduced tax savings for producers over that originally specified by 
ERTA. Table 2 presents the depreciation, taxable income and tax liabi-
lity amounts for each of the TEFRA provisions when applied to the 
1975-79 farm data. In both cases the expensing option is ignored. 
Comparison of these options indicate that in each year the averag~ pro-
ducer realizes smaller taxes by using the prescribed basis reduction 
method. Using this method, tax liability before credits is larger than 
for option 2 method (reducing IC percent). However, the amount of IC is 
substantially larger under option 1, (basis adjustment) thus resulting 
in a lower final tax liability. 
Also represented in Table 2 are the tax amounts resulting from 
application of the original ERTA provisions (ignoring the modifications 
of TEFRA) for 1983. For the average farmer the results of the limita-
tions imposed by the TEFRA are increases in tax liability over that ori-
ginally provided by ERTA. 
The Impacts of Farm Size on Effective Tax Rate Structure 
As has been shown in Tables 1 and 2 the modification of the tax law 
by ERTA has had the effect of reducing the tax liabilities for the 
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average producer in the sample. A comparison of the 1980 and 1981 tax 
laws applied to the 1979 records data indicated that 77 percent realized 
lower taxes under the 1981 law. An additional 20 percent had no tax 
change resulting from the changed tax law. 
The preceding analysis does not address the potential differential 
impacts of the changed tax law across farm sizes. The presence of such 
a size related impact may have serious consequences on the changing size 
structure of agriculture. To address this question, the results of the 
tax !imulation were compared by farm size class. Table 3 presents these 
results for the 1979 production year for six tillable acreage classes. 
Because of the combined effects of changed depreciation methods and 
tax rate reductions schedules, the tax liability for each class is 
reduced for each of the tax code applications, 1980-83. Because the tax 
liability is declining with the application of each successive tax code 
larger amounts of IC are available for carryback/ carryforward. These 
carryback provisions are not reflected in this analysis and, hence, the 
tax savings associated with the ERTA are understated. 
To better illustrate the relative changes in taxes associated with 
increased farm size, consider the following definitions: (1) the 
average tax rate (ATR) is the tax liability (after credits) divided by 
the operator's taxable income, and (2) the gross average tax rate (GATR) 
is the tax liability (after credits) divided by the operator's gross 
receipts. Both measures are expressed in Table 3 as percentages. The 
first measure is comparable to an average tax rate as computed from the 
Internal Revenue Service tax rate schedule except that the measure 
reported in Table 3 uses tax after credits. The calculation was made in 
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this manner in order to display the differential impact of IC across 
farm size. The GATR is intended only as a measure of tax per dollar of 
gross income. 
To examine the effects of farm size on the income tax liability, 
compare the average and gross average tax rates for farms of different 
size classes. For all tax calculation methods these average tax rates 
tend to increase as farm size expands. For each size class, successive 
application of the 1980-83 tax codes results in a substantial decline in 
effective tax rates. Furthermore, the degree of progressivity of the 
tax rate is diminished substantially from application of the 1980 and 
1981 tax codes. Using the class average tax liabilities from table 3, 
the 1981 tax after credits as a percent of the 1980 final tax liability 
ranged from a high of 81.3 percent in the 200- 399 acre class to 71.0 
in the 800 - 999 acre class. Comparison of the within class relative 
change in final tax liability suggests that the progressivity of the tax 
rate is not greatly different for the 1981-83 codes. 
Figure 1 indicates the distribution of the GATR for the 1979 
records data for application of each tax code, 1980-83. With ~ach suc-
cessive tax code application, the percent of producers with a zero tax 
liability increases. Similarly, with each successive tax code applica-
tion the number of producers in the higher effective tax rate classes is 
diminished. Using the 1983 tax code, 69 percent of the sample had gross 
average tax rates of less than 5 percent and 25 percent had a zero tax 
liability. Under the 1980 tax code, these same measures were 56 and 20 
percent, respectively. 
11 
Results of a Statistical Analysis 
In order to measure the size effects of the alternative tax calcu-
lation methods, a tax rate function was estimated for each method. 
Ordinary least squares regression was the analytic tool used. More spe-
cifically, an analysis of covariance technique was applied because of 
the pooled nature of the data (a five year time series of cross sec-
tional data). A pooled analysis was chosen because it takes into 
account more information in the estimation of the farm size-tax obliga-
tion relationship. 
The dependent variable in each scenario was the tax liability after 
credits. In order to reflect differential effects of farm size on the 
tax liability, the estimation equation used was quadratic in operator's 
gross income. Binary variables were included to control for annual 
shifts in the tax function arising due to inflation or productivity 
changes. Results for these analyses are reported in Table 4. 
In all four tax calculation scenarios; the explanatory models were 
highly significant. The regression coefficients for both gross income 
and the square of gross income were statistically significant at the 
0.01 level of probability in each model. The positive coefficients 
indicate a function which is monotonically increasing. 
In order to better view the progressivity of these tax calculation 
methods, additional gross tax rate functions were derived. The gross 
tax function reported in Table 4 is: 
TAX • Bo + Bt GI + B2 GI2 + e1 (1) 
where TAX is the value of the federal income tax liability (after 
credits), Bois the intercept including the appropriate year shifter 
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(binary variable), GI is the operator's gross income, and e1 is a random 
component. The gross tax functions are presented graphically in Figure 
2(a). Note that there are substantial downward shifts in the gross tax 
function for application of each of the tax codes, 1980-1981. 
The gross marginal tax rate function (GMTR) is the first derivative 
of (1) with respect to gross income. 
GMTR c B1 + 2Bz GI + ez (2) 
The GMTR function expresses the marginal change in taxes (as a pro-
portion) as gross income increases. The decline in the slope of the 
GMTR functions from application of the 1980 and 1981 tax codes indicates 
a reduction in the rate ot'progression of the effective tax rate. To 
test the significance of this change in slope, the regression coef-
ficients for income squared were compared for the regressions reported 
in Table 4. The regression coefficient was significantly smaller (at 
the 0.01 probability level) for 1981 law than the 1980 law. The same 
result held for comparison of the 1982 and 1981 regression coeffi-
cients. The conclusion is that the degree of progression of income tax 
with respect to gross income is smaller as a result of the tax code 
changes of 1981 and 1982. The regression coefficients for income 
squared for the 1982 and 1983 tax code regressions were not statisti-
cally different at the 0.1 level of probability. Hence, the rates of 
progression of the 1982 and 1983 tax codes are statistically not dif-
ferent. The GMTR is displayed graphically in Figure 2(b). 
Finally a gross average tax rate function (GATR) was calculated by 
simply dividing (1) by gross income. 
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GATR • Bo/GI + B1 + Bz GI + e 3 ( 3) 
Gross average tax rate is strictly a measure of income tax per dollar of 
gross income and is analogous to the rate calculated directly in Table 
3. The GATR function is shown graphically in Figure 2(c). The dif-
ferential impact of farm size is again apparent from this figure. For a 
gross income level of $300,000, the difference between the 1980 and 1981 
tax liabilities is about two cents for every dollar of gross income. 
Summary 
In the preceding analyses, the federal tax liabilities for indi-
vidual producers were simulated using, in turn, features of the 1980, 
1981, 1982 and 1983 tax codes. ACRS depreciation was significantly 
larger than that calculated under the 1980 tax law. Tax after credits 
also was significantly smaller assuming the 1981 tax law. Further, the 
marginal tax rate was less progressive under the 1981 law. 
The 1981 tax code primarily differed from that of 1982 in the lower 
marginal tax rates of the latter. Producers of all farm sizes realized 
lower average tax rates as a result. By applying the 1982 rather than 
the 1981 tax code, tax as a percent of gross income (GATR) declined from 
3.64 to 3.19 for the average producer (1979 records). The effective 
progressivity of the final tax liability across farms of different sizes 
was essentially unchanged. 
The modifications of the tax law created by the 1982 TEFRA did 
increase the tax liability of the average producer in the sample over 
that which was originally scheduled for 1983 by the ERTA. Still, owing 
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to the reduced marginal tax rates provided in the 1983 code, tax liabi-
lities were reduced from those of the 1982 tax code. The effective 
progressivity of the rate was relatively unchanged between 1982 and 
1983. 
The changes introduced by the ERTA produce a less progressive 
effective tax rate than the existing law which it replaced. The result 
is a smaller tax disincentive for farm size expansion in post-ERTA law 
than in pre-ERTA law. If pre-tax incentives for farm size expansion do 
exist, such expansion is more likely now because tax related disincen-
tives were diminished with the 1981 tax act. 
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Notes 
1. The tax rate cuts occurred for the last quarter only of each year. 
Hence, the effective tax rate reductions were 1.25, 10, 10 and 3.75 
percent in 1981 - 1984, respectively. 
2. In fact, the designated tax code was assumed to have been in place 
prior to 1975. Depreciation for assets purchased in preceeding 
years was recomputed using either the declining balance method 
(1980 tax code) or the ACRS method (1981 and subsequent tax 
codes). 
3. A paired t-test was used to test for differences between the 1980 
and 1981 depreciation amounts. AFYD was included in the 1980 
depreciation. Results indicated the 1980 depreciation was signi-
ficantly smaller (at the 0.01 level) than that under 1981 law. 
16 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[ 1) Boehlje, Michael and Hoy Carmen. "Tax Policy: Implications for 
Producers and the Agricultural Sector." .Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 
64(1982): 1030-37. 
( 2] Casler, George L. "Tax Policy: Implications for Producers and the 
Agricultural Sector: Discussion." .Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 64(1982): 
1047-49. 
(3] Durst, Ron, Wendy Rome, and James Hrubovcak. "The Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981: Provisions of Significance to 
Agriculture." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
ERS, NED Staff Rep. No. AGES 810908B, Sept. 1981. 
{4] Gardner, Bruce L. "Public Policy and the Control of Agricultural 
Production. 11 Amer. J. Agric. Econ. 60(1978): 836-43. 
[5] Mueller, Allan G. "Comparison of Farm Management Service Farms and 
a Random Sample of Farss in Western Illinois," J. Farm Econ. 
36(1954): 285-92. 
[ 6) Raup, Phillip M. "Some Questions of Value and Scale :f_n American 
Agriculture. 11 Amer. J. Agric. Econ. 60(1978): 303-8. 
Table 1: A Comparison of the Depreciation Methods in Pre- and Post-ERTA Tax Law 
Measure Year 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Number of farms 167 167 167 167 167 
Operator's gross income ($} 79,197 90,321 86,263 87,043 98,294 
1980: 
Depreciation ~ ($) 11,804 14,484 15,249 15,239 15,814 
Taxable income ($) 28,540 34,094 28,590 26,541 28,260 
Tax liability before credit~$) 7,291 9,202 7,132 6,450 6,812 
Tax liability after credits b ($} 5,525 6,844 5,414 4,916 5,307 
1981: without expensing option 
Depreciation ($) 13,019 16,665 18,967 20,199 20,834 
Taxable Income ($) 27,335 31,964 25,035 22,086 23.,469 
Tax liability before credits ($) 6,873 s.3s1 5,970 5,087 5,315 
Tax liability after credits Et ($) 5,047 5,936 4,284 3,662 3,952 
1981: with expensing option 
Depreciation ($) 9,178 12,251 14,673 15,872 16,~ 
Expensed investment£/' ($) 4,395 4,535 4,354 4,210 4,215 
Taxable Income ($) 26,792 31,586 24,978 22,178 23,542 
Tax liability before credits ($) 6,717 8,241 5,929 5,101 5,349 
Tax liability after credits~($) 5,268 6,219 4,587 3,973 4,287 
a Includes additional first year depreciation. 
b Tax credits include both investment tax credit and a 1.25 percent credit allowed all taxpayers in 1981. 
c Although the Section 179 Expensing provision was not placed into use until 1982, its provisions were included 
here to illustrate its impact prior without the 1982 tax rate reductions. 
Tabl~ 2: The Impacts of the TEFRA on Depreciation Deductions, Investment Tax Credits and Income Tax liability. 
Measure Year 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Number of farms 167 167 167 167 167 
Operator's gross income ($) 79,197 90,321 86,263 87,043 98,294 
1983: Basis reduction method ~ 
Depreciation ($) 12,416 15,888 18,083 19,270 19,884 
Taxable income ($) 27,920 32,729 25,857 22,896 24,308 
Tax liability before credits ($) 5,749 7,022 5,069 4,330 4,530 
Allowable IC ($) 1,738 2,301 1,613 1,361 1,298 
Tax liability after credits ($) 4,011 4,721 3,456 2,971) 3,232 
1983: IC rate reduction method ~ 
Depreciation ($) 13,019 16,665 18,967 20,199 20,834 
Taxable income ($) 27,335 31,964 25,035 22,086 23,469 
Tax liability before credits ($) 5,585 6,787 4,851 4,132 4,318 
Allowable IC ($) 1,411 1,875 1,307 1,105 1,054 
Tax liability after credits ($) 4,174 4,912 3,543 3,026 3,264 
1983: Without provisions of 1982 TEFRA~ 
Depreciation ($) 13,019 16,665 18,967 20,199 20,834 
Taxable income ($) 27,335 31,964 25,035 22,086 23,469 
Tax liability before credits ($) 5,585 6,787 4,851 4,132 4,318 
Allowable IC ($) 1,718 2,272 1,580 1,329 1,256 
Tax liability after credits ($) 3,868 4,515 3,271 2,803 3,061 
a The basis of depreciable assets is reduced by 50 percent of the amount of investment tax credit. 
b The investment tax credit is reduced from 10 percent to 8 percent for five year property. 
c This simulates the 1981 ERTA law without the modifications imposed by TEFRA. 
d The expensing option is not utilized. 
Table 3. Classification Analysis of the Tax Liabilities 
for the Operator's Share of Farm Receipts, 1979 
·------------------------
Measure 
Number of Observations 
Tillable AcrPage 
Operator's Gross Income 
1980 Tax Lawa/ 
Depreciation 
AFYD 
Taxable Income 
Tax Before Credits 
Allowable IC 
Excess ICb/ 
Tax After Credits 
Average Tax Ratec/ 
Gross Average Tax Rate~/ 
1981 Tax Law: 
Depreciation~/ 
Taxable Income 
Tax Before Credits 
Allowable IC 
Excess ICb/ 
Tax Atter Credits 
Average Tax Ratec/ 
Gross Average Tax Rate~/ 
1982 Tax Law: 
Depreciatione~J 
Taxable Income 
Tax Before Credits 
Allowable IC 
Excess TC£/ 
Tax After Credits 
Average Tax Ratec/ 
Gross Average Tax Rate~/ 
1983 Tax Law:f/ 
Depreciatio;;:~/ 
Taxable Income 
Tax Before Credits 
Allowable IC 
Excess ICb/ 
Tax After Credits 
Average Tax Ratec/ 
Gross Average Tax Rated/ 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
(%) 
(%) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
(%) 
(%) 
($) 
($) 
( $) 
($) 
($) 
( $) 
(%) 
(%) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
($) 
(%) 
(%) 
Under 
200 
3 
174 
41,038 
3,832 
177 
14,372 
2,209 
89 
0 
2,120 
10.6 
3.9 
5,381 
13,000 
1,824 
89 
0 
1' 714 
9.8 
3.2 
5,381 
13,000 
1 '624 
89 
0 
1,535 
8.6 
2.8 
5,203 
13,178 
1 '515 
89 
0 
1,426 
7.8 
2.6 
200-
399 
50 
320 
63,899 
7,284 
1,683 
21,247 
4,343 
843 
358 
3,500 
11.3 
4. 7 
11,413 
18,900 
3,680 
796 
405 
2,847 
9.8 
3.8 
11 '413 
18,771 
3,299 
775 
423 
2,524 
8.6 
3.3 
10,905 
19,351 
3,083 
777 
424 
2 '305 
7.8 
3.0 
SIZE CLASS 
(Tillable Acres) 
400- 600-
599 799 
65 
493 
92,842 
13,059 
2,369 
28,469 
6,447 
1,512 
379 
4,935 
13.8 
4.9 
20,527 
23,521 
5,000 
1,322 
569 
3,632 
10.8 
3.5 
20,527 
23,125 
4,487 
1,284 
608 
3, 203 
9.5 
3.1 
19,581 
24,404 
4,271 
1,302 
589 
2,969 
8.6 
2.9 
28 
682 
115,834 
17,365 
3,045 
30,164 
7,328 
2,267 
642 
5,061 
12.1 
4.3 
26,309 
24,331 
5,582 
1,907 
1,002 
3,629 
9.1 
3.1 
26,309 
23,705 
5,012 
1,845 
1,064 
3,167 
7.9 
2.7 
25,102 
25,446 
4,801 
1,883 
1,026 
2,918 
7.1 
2.5 
a/ Utilizes the declining balance method of depreciation calculation. 
800-
999 
11 
884 
161,579 
21,836 
2,442 
46,608 
14,474 
1, 938 
909 
12,536 
21.0 
7.6 
34' 17 7 
37,424 
10,640 
1,623 
1,224 
8,904 
17.3 
5.4 
34,177 
36,709 
9,573 
1, 612 
1,235 
7,961 
15.3 
4.8 
32,598 
38,824 
9,115 
1 '636 
1,211 
7,479 
14.0 
4.5 
1,000 
& Over 
10 
1,224 
204,164 
30,798 
3,108 
40,621 
13,039 
2,588 
1,559 
10,451 
16.0 
4.7 
44,568 
31, 352 
9,985 
2,213 
1,934 
7,675 
12.4 
3.4 
44,568 
29,625 
8,995 
2,208 
1 '938 
6,786 
10.8 
3.0 
42,564 
32' 653 
8,546 
2,225 
11922 
6' 321 
9.9 
2.8 
b/ This is the amount by which IC exceeds tax liability. These credits are available 
for carryback/carryforward. 
£1 (Tax After Credits/Taxable Income) x 100 
d/ (Tax After Credits/Operator's Gross Income) x 100 
~I The expensing option was not used. 
f/ The basis for depreciation was reduced by 50 percent of the investment tax credit 
as required by TEFRA. 
Table 4. A Covariance Analysis of Tax After Credits as a Function of 
Operator's Gross Income, Illinois Cash Grain Farms, 1975-79. 
1980 Tax Lawa/ 1981 Tax Law6J 1982 Tax Law6/ 1983 Tax LawCJ 
Variable B t B 
Intercept -1911 -2.27-kk -1198 
Gross Income 0.075 5.01* 0.062 
Gross Income 
Squared 1. 95 E-7 3.12* 1.68 E-7 
Binary Variables: 
Year= 1976 60 0.10 -173 
Year = 1977 -898 -1.57 -1427 
Year "" 1978 -1506 -2.64* -2142 
Year =- 1979 -2414 -4.18* -2948 
R-Square .48 0.44 
F-Value 128.66* 110.05* 
a/ Utilizes declining balance depreciation method. 
b/ The expensing option is not included. 
t B t B t 
-1.54 -1086 -1.54 -946 -1.47 
4.52* 0.055 4.39* 0.048 4.18* 
2.92* 1. 50 E-7 2.87* 1. 50 E-7 3.12* 
-0.33 -176 -0.36 -151 -0.34 
-2.71* -1272 -2.66* -1092 -2.49** 
-4.06* -1901 -3. 92* -1655 -3.78* 
-5. 53* -2586 -5.35* -2283 -5.16* 
0.43 0.43 
104.80* 105.47* 
~I Basis for depreciat1on calculation is reduced by 1/2 of the investment tax credit as required by the 
1982 TEFRA. The expensing option is not included. 
* Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of probability. 
** Statistically signif1cant at the 0.05 level of probability. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.10 level of probability. 
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F~gure 1: Distributions of the gross average tax rate for 
applicat~on of the 1980, 1981, 1982, aud 1983 tax 
codes to the 1979 FBFM sample data. 
A. 1980 tax codeij 
B. 1981 tax codez/ 
C. 1982 tax code- I 
D. 1983 tax cod~ 
1. Uses decl~ning balance depreciat~on method 
2. ACRS depreciation without expensing provis~on 
3. Depreciable basis is reduced by 1/2 IC as 
required by TEFRA 

